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This study reproduces and extends the work of Tanya Byker (2016). Her findings 
on the positive effect of paid family leave on labor-force participation and employment as 
well as the negative effect on unemployment are reproduced and extended across a 
further range of time periods. The evidence presented in this paper supports her 
hypothesis that paid family leave indeed has the potential to increase the labor-force 
participation of women in the months surrounding childbirth, especially for women 
without college degrees. Testing robustness of estimates to weighting yields similar 
patterns of labor-market outcomes for both weighted and unweighted regressions. 
Extension of Byker’s regressions to mothers of different occupational groups 
reveals differential effects of paid leave policy. While analysis women in management 
occupations as well as women in office and administrative support roles yields estimates 
mirroring those of the full sample, analysis of women in education, training, and library 
occupations reveals contrary effects of paid family leave policy. These results suggest 
that occupation is an important factor in determining the effect of paid family leave 
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I.  Introduction 
 
 Paid family leave policies have the potential to increase labor-force attachments 
and reduce career interruptions, contributing to the closing of the gender earnings gap. 
Tanya Byker (2016) estimates the impact of the California and New Jersey paid family 
leave policies on these labor-market outcomes. Using data from the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP), Byker conducts a difference-in-difference analysis 
comparing labor-force participation and employment of women who gave birth in states 
that enacted a paid family leave policy (California and New Jersey) to women who gave 
birth in control states (Florida, New York, and Texas). She finds a statistically significant 
positive effect of paid family leave policies on labor-force participation and employment 
of women without college degrees. 
In this paper, I reproduce Byker’s analysis, testing the robustness of her findings 
as well as well as extending tests for significance across a greater range of time periods. 
Based on her hypothesis that paid family leave policies have greater effect on women 
with less education due to less prior access to paid family leave, I hypothesize that the 
policy might have differential effects based on occupational group. To test this 
hypothesis, I matched data on occupation from the SIPP to the individuals in Byker’s 
sample. I then divide the sample into occupational groups and conduct the difference-in-
difference analysis on white-collar workers, blue-collar workers, and individual 





family leave on workers of different occupations, I report estimates of regressions run on 
three distinct occupational groups.  
I reproduce Byker’s findings on the positive effect of paid family leave on labor-
force participation and employment as well as the negative effect on unemployment of 
women without college degrees. I add detail on the time frames for which this effect is 
significant, finding additionally significant effects not reported in her work. I find her 
estimates are robust to weighting. Finally, I find that while the analysis of women in 
management occupations as well as women in office and administrative support roles 
yields estimates mirroring those of the full sample, analysis of women in education, 
training, and library occupations reveals contrary effects of paid family leave policy.  
 
II. Policy Landscape 
 
Since 1993, eligible US workers have had access to 12 weeks of unpaid leave 
under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). However, due to firm size and work 
history requirements, eligibility is far from universal, and typical use is even smaller. In 
2012, the Department of Labor estimated that fewer than 60% of workers nationwide 
were eligible for FMLA leave and only 16% of those eligible workers actually took 
FMLA leave (Klerman, Daley, and Pozniak 2012). It is perhaps because of the low usage 
(or the meager benefits) that previous studies have found no effect of FMLA on mothers’ 





Enacted in September 2002, the California Paid Family Leave legislation (CA-
PFL) went into effect July 2004. Prior to the enactment of the CA-PFL, California 
mothers were covered by a Temporary Disability Insurance program (TDI) which 
typically provides mothers with six weeks of compensated leave to be used during 
pregnancy or immediately after childbirth. The state’s TDI program uses the same benefit 
formula as the CA-PFL, providing 55% of base pay up to a cap. California’s TDI 
program, however, provides benefits only to mothers in the four weeks before birth and 
for six weeks afterward. Under the CA-PFL, eligible mothers and fathers are both entitled 
to 6 weeks of paid leave, providing 55% of base pay constrained by a cap on payment 
($1,163 per week in 2014 and $1,252 in 2019)1, with mothers additionally entitled to the 
benefits of the TDI. The programs are coordinated such that mothers may take leave 
under the CA-PFL immediately following leave under the TDI.  
Officially entitled the Family Temporary Disability Leave law, the New Jersey 
Paid Family Leave legislation (NJ-PFL) came into effect in July 2009.  Like California, 
New Jersey’s Paid Family Leave program extends existing paid compensation (of 2/3 of 
weekly pay up to a cap) available to mothers in the 4 weeks before birth and 6 weeks 
afterward. The NJ-PFL grants 6 weeks of paid leave to eligible mothers and fathers, 
providing 2/3 of average weekly pay up to a set maximum that has varied over time 
($643 in per week in 2014)2. Eligible workers are those individuals who have worked at 
                                                 
1 In terms of 2019 dollars 





least 20 calendar weeks in New Jersey or who have earned at least $7,150 in the 12 
months preceding requested leave.  
Under both policies, workers may take leave within 12 months of birth, and leave 
may be taken concurrently or intermittently. Both policies are funded by a payroll tax on 
state workers.  
 
III. Literature Review 
 
 In addition to the work of Tanya Byker upon which this paper is primarily based, 
a literature of other work has helped to inform and contextualize this analysis. Rossin-
Slater, Ruhm, and Waldfogel (2013) estimate the effect of the CA-PFL on leave-taking of 
mothers following childbirth, as well as their subsequent labor market outcomes. The 
authors theorize that the policy will increase rates of leave-taking among California 
mothers, however the predicted effect on employment is ambiguous. If the increase of 
leave-taking comes primarily from mothers who would otherwise have continued 
employment, the policy would result in a decrease in work but no change in employment. 
If the increase of leave-taking comes primarily from mothers who would otherwise have 
terminated employment, the policy would result in an increase in mothers’ employment 
in the short-term, with possible positive effects on mothers’ employment in the medium 
and long-term. 
To estimate the impact of the CA-PFL, Rossin-Slater et al. utilize difference-in-





Current Population Survey. The authors find that the CA-PFL doubled use of maternity 
leave from three weeks on average to six weeks on average. Although they find no 
statistically significant effect, point estimates suggest that the CA-PFL could indeed 
increase medium-term employment rates of mothers. Rossin-Slater et al. do however find 
a statistically significant 10 to 17 percent increase in the usual weekly work hours of 
employed mothers of one-to-three year-old children. The authors propose that this 
increase could be a result of increased job continuity and the longer work hours 
associated with the accumulation of firm-specific human capital. They acknowledge 
however that the mechanism for the increase in work hours is not clear from their study.  
 Baum and Ruhm (2014) use the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth to investigate the effect of the CA-PFL on various labor market 
outcomes. The authors find that the CA-PFL raised leave-taking on average by one week 
for fathers and three weeks for mothers. According to their analysis, the authors find that 
the largest effect of the CA-PFL on mothers’ leave-taking occurs 6 to 14 weeks after 
birth. The finding is intuitive, as the CA-PFL can be combined with California’s 
preexisting Temporary Disability Insurance program, which provides six weeks of paid 
leave to mothers following childbirth. Baum and Ruhm also find that the policy both 
increased the probability that a mother has returned to work in the year after birth and 
raised mothers’ weekly hours of work in the second year after birth. They do not, 
however, find a statistically significant effect upon mothers’ wages. Baum and Ruhm, 
similarly to Rossin-Slater et al., hypothesize that the medium-term increases in 





 Das and Polachek (2015) use data from the March Current Population 
Survey to explore the impact of the CA-PFL on labor force participation and 
unemployment outcomes. Using a difference-in-difference framework, the authors find 
that the CA-PFL increased the labor-force participation of young women in California by 
about 1.5 percentage points relative to other states. Das and Polachek also investigate 
unintended negative consequences of the law, and find that the policy resulted in an 
increase in unemployment of young women of between 0.3 and 1.5 percentage points. 
They also find an increase in average duration of unemployment for young women by 
about 4 to 9 percent.  
 Curtis, Hirsch, and Schroeder (2016) use data from the Quarterly 
Workforce Indicators to estimate the effect of the CA-PFL on labor market outcomes by 
examining employment flows and wage offers among new hires. The authors find that 
although the CA-PFL had little effect on earnings for young women in California, the 
policy did result in increased labor market churn (defined by the authors as separations, 
hires, and recalls). 
Bartel et al. (2018) use data from the 2000 Census and the 2000 to 2013 waves of 
the American Community Survey to investigate the effect of the California Paid Family 
Leave law on fathers’ leave-taking. The authors find that the policy raised leave-taking 
rates of fathers by 46 percent, although fathers still on average only take 1.5 weeks out of 
the total 6 weeks of leave for which they are eligible under CA-PFL. In contrast, mothers 
on average take 9 weeks out of the 12 total weeks for which they are eligible under the 








 The California and New Jersey paid family leave policies contain aspects of both 
a payroll tax and employer mandate. The monetary cost of wage replacement is funded 
by a payroll tax on workers, while the opportunity cost to the firm of employee time 
spent on leave fits the model of employer mandate. No matter how the policy is framed, 
as Jonathan Gruber puts it, “the general distinction between payroll taxes and mandates is 
a false one” (2010). The labor-market effects depend upon tax/benefit linkages, not the 
particular legislative frame of the policy. In both a payroll tax and employer mandate, 
there is a cost borne and a benefit received, with incidence of each determined by the 
elasticities of labor supply and demand.  
 According to the simple model, the payroll tax creates a wedge between labor 
supply and demand, reducing both wages and employment of workers, and creating 
deadweight loss. The conferral of benefits to workers, monetary or otherwise, increases 
the total value of employment for workers and accordingly increases labor supply and 
reduces the wedge imposed by the tax. Except for the special case in which employees 
value benefits at exactly the value of lost wages, there will remain a residual wedge 
between supply and demand, resulting in lower employment than equilibrium in the 
absence of the tax.  
 In the case of the California and New Jersey paid family leave policies, the simple 





workers, the benefits gained are dependent upon worker characteristics. As found by 
Slater et al. (2012), and Baum and Ruhm (2014), women take paid family leave for 
longer periods of time and in greater proportion than men. It is possible that young 
women value the benefits granted by the CA-PFL and NJ-PFL in excess of the cost they 
bear, leading to an increased labor supply of young women and higher employment 
compared to the prior equilibrium.  
 In addition to the monetary cost of payroll taxation, it is important to consider the 
opportunity cost of employee leave. Although the costs may not be significant in many 
cases, firms may be required to hire temporary, less productive, replacement labor. If the 
employee’s firm-specific skills depreciate during leave, firms may also have to bear the 
cost. Because young women are most likely to take family leave, firms may discriminate 
against hiring them in favor of men and older women. The combination of increased 
labor-force participation of young women and decreased demand for their labor could 
result in increased unemployment of young women (Das and Polachek 2015).  
 Paid family leave may have additional effects upon labor-market outcomes of 
mothers in particular. The benefits of the policy may only be claimed if the individual 
remains attached to her employer during pregnancy and after childbirth, incentivizing job 
continuity of mothers. As previous studies have concluded, job continuity is an important 
factor in the later employment and wages of mothers (Waldfogel 1998). The positive 
effect of paid family leave policies on job continuity of mothers may therefore lead to 
positive impacts on labor-force participation, employment, and wages of mothers that are 





 In view of the various possible shifts in supply and demand it is unclear where the 
post-policy equilibrium of mothers’ labor-force participation and employment will land. 
To empirically investigate the effects of California and New Jersey’s paid family leave 
program on mothers’ labor-market outcomes in various periods of time relative to 




The data in this paper originates from four panels of the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation, described in Table 1. Each panel covers a national stratified 
sample of the U.S. civilian non-institutionalized population and uses a 4-month recall 
period, with respondents divided into rotation groups with each group interviewed during 
one month of the four-month period. Each four-month period constitutes a wave of the 
survey. As respondents to the survey are recorded over differing lengths of time, the 
dataset constitutes an unbalanced panel.  
 
Table 1: Panel Years of Data 
SIPP Panel Number of Waves First Month Last Month 
1996 12 Dec 1996 Feb 2000 
2001 8 Oct 2000 Dec 2003 
2004 12 Oct 2003 Dec 2007   
2008 16 May 2008 Dec 2013 
 
Using data from the four panels, Byker constructed a sample of 2,817 unique 





gave birth during the time coverage of the SIPP panel and lived within one of the 
treatment states (California and New Jersey) or control states (Florida, New York, and 
Texas). By connecting information on the date of birth of children with information 
identifying their mothers, Byker was able to generate a variable identifying the month of 
childbirth for each mother. Using her constructed sample and the full SIPP dataset, I 
appended additional information on employment to each observation. In both Byker’s 
and my own analysis, individuals that moved states are counted in both state categories.  
 
Table 2: Unique Individual Counts by State and Year3 
 California Florida New Jersey New York Texas  
Year      Total 
1995 62 23 19 43 48 195 
1996 319 105 76 166 211 873 
1997 318 107 74 162 216 873 
1998 303 97 68 151 208 823 
1999 283 87 64 140 185 758 
2000 282 95 58 145 207 787 
2001 207 76 48 106 149 583 
2002 201 77 44 96 144 562 
2003 341 139 91 162 234 963 
2004 204 99 59 103 143 604 
2005 201 96 56 103 146 597 
2006 197 91 52 98 140 576 
2007 127 69 27 71 80 372 
2008 222 86 74 86 150 618 
2009 225 85 75 91 160 631 
2010 220 86 73 90 163 630 
2011 218 83 69 83 161 612 
2012 148 51 41 52 103 395 
Total 1002 389 276 485 707 2817 
 
                                                 





Information on labor-force participation and employment is derived from a 
categorical SIPP variable encoding the employment status of an individual for a given 
month. Following Byker’s methodology, I reduced this information into three binary 
variables describing whether a person is in or out of the labor-force, employed or 
unemployed, and searching for work or not searching for work4. Observation counts and 
categorical proportions of the total sample are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3: Employment Status for Reference Month 
Employment / Labor-force Status Person-Months Proportion 
With a job entire month, worked all weeks (includes individuals on 
paid leave) 
57,373 55.4% 
With a job entire month, absent from work without pay 1+ weeks, 
absence not due to layoff 
2,595 2.51% 
With a job entire month, absent from work without pay 1+ weeks, 
absence due to layoff 
450 0.43% 
With a job at least 1 but not all weeks, no time on layoff and no time 
looking for work 
1148 1.11% 
With a job at least 1 but not all weeks, remaining weeks on layoff or 
looking for work 
523 0.51% 
No job all month, on layoff or looking for work all weeks 3,323 3.21% 
No job all month, at least one but not all weeks on layoff or looking 
for work 
440 0.44% 
No job all month, no time on layoff and no time looking for work. 37,756 36.4% 
Missing data 16 0.02% 
 
 The SIPP allows for information on two possible jobs to be recorded for any 
given month. In the case of an individual holding multiple jobs during a reference month, 
the job by which the individual earned the most money over the four-month period will 
be listed as job 1. The job that provided the next most earnings in the four-month period 
                                                 





will be listed as job 2. In order to simplify the analysis, only data on job 1 was used in 
this paper, and each individual was placed into occupation groups according to job 1.   
 An important aspect of the data is that the SIPP changed the encoding of 
occupations after the 2001 panel. The 1996 and 2001 panels of the SIPP encode 
occupations according to the 1990 Census Bureau occupational classification scheme, 
while the 2004 and 2008 panels utilize the classification scheme from the 2000 Census. 
This means that pre-2004 panel occupations cannot be directly matched to 2004 and later 
panel occupations. However, both types of occupation coding systems could still be 
placed into general occupation groups (specified by the Standard Occupational 
Classification system). Individuals were placed into occupation groups according to their 
occupation most recently recorded before birth.5 I then codified each occupation group as 
either ‘white collar’ or ‘blue collar’. The results of this processing are reported in Table 
4. 
  
                                                 
5 As some individuals were classified as unemployed or out of the labor-force immediately prior to birth or 
had missing data on occupation, the month relative to birth used to extract this information differs from 





Table 4: Occupation Group Summary Statistics 
Pre-birth Occupation Group White Collar 
/ Blue Collar 
Count Proportion Percent 
College 
Graduate 
Management White Collar 131 7.06% 51.1% 
Business and Finance White Collar 86 4.63% 64.8% 
Computer Science and 
Mathematics 
White Collar 38 2.05% 80.5% 
Architecture and 
Engineering 
White Collar 24 1.29% 78.3% 
Life, Physical, And Social 
Science 
White Collar 16 0.86% 80.0% 
Community and Social 
Service 
White Collar 43 2.32% 81.1% 
Law White Collar 20 1.08% 68.9% 
Education, Training, and 
Library 
White Collar 195 10.5% 79.2% 
Arts, Design, 
Entertainment, Sports 
White Collar 28 1.51% 81.9% 
Healthcare Practitioners and 
Technicians  
White Collar 169 9.12% 61.3% 
Healthcare Support White Collar 81 4.37% 12.7% 
Sales and Related 
Occupations 
White Collar 190 10.2% 41.4% 
Office and Administrative 
Support 
White Collar 424 22.9% 20.8% 
Protective Service  Blue Collar 78 0.70% 28.5% 
Food Preparation and 
Serving 
Blue Collar 89 4.80% 6.00% 
Building/Grounds Cleaning 
and Maintenance 
Blue Collar 54 2.91% 6.80% 
Personal Care and Service Blue Collar 78 4.2% 14.3% 
Farming, Fishing, and 
Forestry 
Blue Collar 25 1.35% 1.63% 
Construction and Extraction Blue Collar 6 0.32% 0.00% 
Installation, Maintenance, 
and Repair 
Blue Collar 5 0.27% 12.7% 
Production  Blue Collar 80 4.31% 11.2% 
Transportation and Material 
Moving 
Blue Collar 20 1.08% 10.5% 
Unclassified N/A 39 2.11% N/A 
 Total Unique 
Individuals 






To investigate whether the segmentation by educational attainment and the 
segmentation by occupation type capture the same subpopulations, I cross tabulate the 
two categories and report the results in Table 5 and Table 6. The cross tabulations in the 
following two tables indicate that while there is overlap, the two segmentations indeed 
divide the sample differently.  
 
Table 5: Person-Month Frequency Table for Education / Employment Type 
 White collar Blue collar Totals 
Less than College 29101 (69.2%) 12722 (30.8%) 41823 (100%) 
College Educated 25484 (95.1%) 1208   (4.9%) 26692 (100%) 
Totals 54585 13930 68515 
 
Table 6: Person Frequency Table for Education / Employment Type 
 White collar Blue collar Totals 
Less than College 807 (70.4%) 340 (29.6%) 1147 (100%) 
College Educated 685 (94.9 %) 37 (5.1%) 722 (100%) 










Yits : Labor-force outcome for woman i living in state s in period t  
αi : Individual fixed effects 
λt : Year Indicators 
θs : State Indicators 
∑ : Months Since Birth Indicators6 
 
Equation 1: Model Specification 
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 The specification above is a variation of generalized difference-in-difference 
regression used by Byker to estimate the effect of the paid family leave policy on labor-
market outcomes of mothers. Specifically, the specification is used to estimate the effect 
of the paid family leave policy on three labor-market outcomes: probability of 
participating in the labor-force, probability of being employed, and probability of 
unemployment / looking for work.7 The individual fixed effects control for confounding 
from unobserved characteristics of each individual. The interacted year and state 
                                                 
6 Months -24 to -18 are omitted to serve as a reference period  
7 It is important to note that a positive effect on employment does not imply a negative effect on 
unemployment, as increased probability of labor-force participation may lead to both increased probability 





indicators control for time trends in each state that may confound the estimation of the 
effect of the policy on the outcome of interest. The year X months since birth dummies 
control for differences in the pattern of the outcome variable across years, while the state 
X months since birth dummies control for differences in the pattern of the outcome 
variable across states. Each of the βj coefficients represents the individual effect of the 
policy on the probability of the labor-market outcome for each month, controlling for the 
effects on all other months. 
Following the specification outlined by Byker (2016). I estimate Equation 1 for 
each of the five sample groups of interest: full sample, college educated and non-college 
educated, blue-collar and white-collar, with labor-force participation as the dependent 
variable. I then repeat the process using the ‘working’ and ‘looking for work’ variables. 
The point estimates of the interacted ‘months since birth’ indicators and the policy 
variable are visualized in the various figures of this paper. As the effect of the policy for a 
given month is unlikely to be significantly different from the effect of the policy for any 
other given month, I follow Byker’s method of using joint tests for significance. In order 
to provide more detailed information on the effect of paid family leave policy across 
various time windows, I analyze 15 distinct windows in addition to Byker’s original 
reported window. For each of these windows, I report the probability values for joint tests 
of significance, the sums of the coefficients, and the probability values for tests of 






In her 2016 study, Byker estimates Equation 1 weighted by person weights 
provided by the Survey of Income and Program Participation. Although ordinary least 
squares estimation is unbiased even in the presence of heteroscedasticity, weighted least 
squares can in some cases improve the efficiency of the estimation. Considering the small 
sample sizes used in this study, the efficiency of the estimator is an important 
consideration. However, if point estimates obtained are sensitive to weighting, it could 
signify misspecification of the model. In order to check the robustness of coefficients, I 
repeat her estimations without weighting. Figures comparing point estimates for both the 
weighted and unweighted regressions are reported in section VIII. Tables containing 
values of point estimates for weighted and unweighted regressions are reported in the 
Appendix.  
Finally, in section IX, I report results of regressions run on three occupational 
groups: management occupations, office and administrative support occupations, and 
education, training, and library occupations. I chose to report results from these three 
occupational groups both because of their relatively large sample sizes compared to other 
occupational groups and because of the insight of the findings. Like previously in the 
paper, I report figures of point estimates, probability values of tests for joint significance, 
and probability values of tests of sums of coefficients.  
The difference-in-difference specification used in this study implies a number of 
assumptions about the data. First and foremost is the assumption of parallel trends. The 
parallel trends assumption is violated if there exists unobserved time-varying 





the treatment group would have followed a parallel time trend as the control group if the 
treatment had not taken place. As we cannot observe the counterfactual, we have no 
empirical method to confirm this assumption.  
Another important assumption is the exogeneity of treatment. The estimation is 
unbiased only if the assignment of treatment is not caused in any way by the outcome 
variable. In this case, it is likely that the assumption holds, as is unlikely that policy-
makers enacted paid leave policies as a result of any particular pattern of mothers’ labor 
force participation.  
Unbiased difference-in-difference estimation requires the assumption that pre-
treatment outcomes are not affected by treatment. That is, we assume that mothers do not 
anticipate the implementation of a paid leave policy and adjust their labor force 
participation accordingly. It is quite possible that this assumption is violated in this 
analysis. Mothers expecting shortly before the implementation of a paid leave policy, 
who would otherwise have dropped out of the labor-force, may have stayed in the labor-
force anticipating eligibility for paid leave once the policy came into effect. However, if 
the proportion of mothers who were pregnant in the 9 months before the implementation 
of a paid leave policy is small compared to the total sample, the effect on the DiD 






VII. Reproduction and Extension Results 
 
A. Labor Force Participation 
 
Figure 1 depicts the point estimates of the effect of paid family leave policy on 
labor-force participation estimated via Equation 1.8 Table 7 contains probability values 
for the joint significance of paid family leave policy over 15 distinct windows. Table 8 
contains the sums of the months since birth X policy coefficients for each window. These 
sums represent the expected value of increase or decrease in person-months of labor-
force participation. Table 9 contains the probability values for the significance of the 
coefficient sums.  
The results confirm the findings of Byker concerning labor-force participation. 
There are indeed positive (estimated increase of 0.55 person-months) and significant 
effects of paid family leave policy on the labor-force participation of mothers in the 
period of three months before birth to three months after birth (p-value of test for joint 
significance is 0.04). The results support Byker’s conclusion that this effect is primarily 
driven by women without college degrees: the estimated effect is an increase of 0.79 




                                                 
8 Each graph of point estimates presented in this paper sets the coefficients of months -24 to -18 to zero, as 












Table 7: LFP  P-Values of Joint Tests: Months Since Birth * Policy Coefficients9 
Months 
Since Birth 







-17 to -12 0.26 0.33 0.12 0.42 0.20 
-15 to -9 0.22 0.52 0.36 0.28 0.31 
-12 to -6 0.36 0.55 0.55 0.12 0.36 
-9 to -3 0.16 0.71 0.27 0.02** 0.82 
-6 to 0 0.12 0.95 0.03** 0.11 0.31 
-3 to +3 0.04** 0.75 0.02** 0.17 0.16 
0 to + 6 0.16 0.51 0.25 0.36 0.14 
+3 to +9 0.55 0.56 0.68 0.59 0.36 
+6 to +12 0.41 0.62 0.49 0.59 0.34 
+9 to +15 0.13 0.56 0.20 0.31 0.51 
+12 to + 18 0.15 0.63 0.13 0.46 0.51 
+15 to +21 0.24 0.93 0.14 0.68 0.65 
+18 to +24 0.29 0.72 0.24 0.63 0.35 
-17 to 0 0.11 0.58 0.01** 0.08* 0.14 
0 to 24 0.05* 0.63 0.07* 0.37 0.18 
 
Table 8: LFP  Sums Months Since Birth * Policy Coefficients 
Months 
Since Birth 







-17 to -12 0.25 -0.03 0.32 0.08 1.03 
-15 to -9 0.23 -0.19 0.30 0.10 0.90 
-12 to -6 0.19 -0.22 0.19 0.18 0.35 
-9 to -3 0.34 -0.15 0.39 0.45 0.37 
-6 to 0 0.58 -0.12 0.75 0.65 0.70 
-3 to +3 0.55 -0.34 0.79 0.46 0.64 
0 to + 6 0.43 -0.43 0.62 0.29 0.45 
+3 to +9 0.25 -0.41 0.32 0.19 0.04 
+6 to +12 0.12 -0.52 0.15 0.17 -0.20 
+9 to +15 0.12 -0.65 0.17 0.19 -0.48 
+12 to + 18 0.25 -0.60 0.31 0.25 -0.40 
+15 to +21 0.27 -0.62 0.37 0.29 -0.03 
+18 to +24 0.21 -0.56 0.32 0.30 0.49 
-17 to 0 0.91 -0.35 1.14 0.78 1.84 
0 to 24 0.90 -1.88 1.26 0.90 0.38 
                                                 
9 In each table of probability values, significance at the 10% level is signified by *, while significance at the 





Table 9: LFP P-Values of Joint Tests for Significance of Sums 
Months 
Since Birth 







-17 to -12 0.18 0.90 0.24 0.70 0.08* 
-15 to -9 0.39 0.54 0.44 0.76 0.22 
-12 to -6 0.53 0.55 0.68 0.62 0.65 
-9 to -3 0.33 0.71 0.45 0.26 0.66 
-6 to 0 0.13 0.79 0.18 0.12 0.44 
-3 to +3 0.18 0.51 0.17 0.32 0.52 
0 to + 6 0.32 0.47 0.30 0.57 0.67 
+3 to +9 0.59 0.54 0.61 0.72 0.97 
+6 to +12 0.81 0.47 0.82 0.76 0.86 
+9 to +15 0.82 0.41 0.80 0.75 0.69 
+12 to + 18 0.65 0.47 0.67 0.69 0.74 
+15 to +21 0.64 0.48 0.63 0.66 0.98 
+18 to +24 0.72 0.54 0.69 0.65 0.69 
-17 to 0 0.21 0.69 0.29 0.34 0.31 






 Figure 2 illustrates the point estimates of the effect of paid family leave policy on 
employment of mothers. Table 10 contains probability values for the joint tests of 
significance of paid family leave across the various windows of time. Table 11 reports 
the values of the sums of coefficients for the effect of paid family leave policy on 
employment. These sums represent the estimated person-month change in employment 
due to paid family leave policy across windows.  
 
Table 12 contains the probability values of tests for significance of coefficients sums for 





In her work, Byker reports a positive and significant effect of paid family leave 
policy on the employment of women without college degrees in the window of six 
months after birth to twelve months after birth (estimated increase of 1 person-month of 
employment with a p-value of 0.33). The results show, however, that there are positive 
and significant effects on employment of mothers without college degrees in three 
windows ranging from nine months before birth to three months after birth. Indeed, the 
coefficients of all months before birth are jointly significant. This indicates that the 
positive effect of paid family leave on employment of mothers without college degrees 














Table 10: Employment P-Values of Joint Tests: Months Since Birth * Policy Coefficients 
Months 
Since Birth 







-17 to -12 0.63 0.27 0.76 0.84 0.72 
-15 to -9 0.74 0.71 0.82 0.70 0.44 
-12 to -6 0.79 0.69 0.49 0.62 0.77 
-9 to -3 0.21 0.88 0.02** 0.58 0.26 
-6 to 0 0.21 0.62 0.02** 0.67 0.28 
-3 to +3  0.35 0.52 0.08* 0.57 0.62 
0 to + 6 0.83 0.58 0.32 0.85 0.43 
+3 to +9 0.77 0.96 0.33 0.96 0.18 
+6 to +12 0.67 0.89 0.33 0.97 0.13 
+9 to +15 0.25 0.67 0.50 0.36 0.14 
+12 to +18 0.28 0.72 0.34 0.45 0.36 
+15 to +21 0.54 0.95 0.46 0.59 0.32 
+18 to +24 0.52 0.93 0.26 0.73 0.13 
-17 to 0 0.41 0.55 0.08* 0.80 0.52 
0 to 24 0.80 0.93 0.41 0.95 0.19 
 
Table 11: Employment Sums of Months Since Birth * Policy Coefficients 
Months 
Since Birth 







-17 to -12 0.23 -0.15 0.41 0.12 0.82 
-15 to -9 0.18 -0.34 0.37 0.13 0.56 
-12 to -6 0.13 -0.53 0.37 0.16 0.20 
-9 to -3 0.43 -0.49 0.82 0.44 0.80 
-6 to 0 0.59 -0.62 1.16 0.55 1.15 
-3 to +3 0.64 -0.61 1.19 0.59 0.99 
0 to + 6 0.64 -0.65 1.19 0.55 1.03 
+3 to +9 0.57 -0.63 1.07 0.40 1.32 
+6 to +12 0.52 -0.67 1.00 0.36 1.50 
+9 to +15 0.56 -0.55 0.94 0.46 1.27 
+12 to + 18 0.68 -0.49 1.08 0.58 1.36 
+15 to +21 0.73 -0.48 1.16 0.66 1.47 
+18 to +24 0.64 -0.34 1.01 0.58 1.41 
-17 to 0 0.88 -1.13 1.77 0.75 2.03 







Table 12: Employment P-Values of Joint Tests for Significance of Sums 
Months 
Since Birth 







-17 to -12 0.27 0.62 0.15 0.66 0.18 
-15 to -9 0.52 0.37 0.36 0.73 0.46 
-12 to -6 0.68 0.22 0.44 0.71 0.81 
-9 to -3 0.25 0.31 0.12 0.31 0.35 
-6 to 0 0.14 0.25 0.04** 0.25 0.21 
-3 to +3 0.13 0.32 0.04** 0.26 0.32 
0 to + 6 0.15 0.33 0.05* 0.32 0.33 
+3 to +9 0.24 0.41 0.09* 0.50 0.24 
+6 to +12 0.30 0.41 0.13 0.56 0.21 
+9 to +15 0.28 0.51 0.17 0.47 0.30 
+12 to + 18 0.22 0.58 0.14 0.38 0.28 
+15 to +21 0.21 0.62 0.13 0.34 0.27 
+18 to +24 0.29 0.74 0.19 0.43 0.30 
-17 to 0 0.25 0.28 0.10 0.43 0.26 
0 to 24 0.22 0.53 0.11 0.39 0.25 
 
 C. Unemployment 
 
 Figure 3 graphs the point estimates of the effect of paid family leave policy on 
unemployment of mothers (in the labor force and searching for a job). Table 13 contains 
probability values for the joint significance of the effect paid family leave policy on 
unemployment for the fifteen time period windows. Table 14 lists the sums of 
coefficients for each window, representing the estimated effect of paid family leave 
policy on unemployment in person-months. Table 15 contains the probability values for 
the tests of significance for the coefficient sums.  
Byker reports a negative and significant effect of paid family leave policy on 
unemployment of women without college degrees in the window of six months after birth 





person-months of unemployment with a p-value of 0.04 yielded from joint tests for 
significance. The results presented here show that there are negative effects significant at 
the 10% level for both the preceding and following window. Although joint tests for 
significance for the full sample yield p-values of less than 0.1 in a number of windows, 
sums of coefficients are close to zero, and tests of sums of coefficients for the full sample 













Table 13: Unemployment P-Values of Joint Tests: Months Since Birth * Policy Coefficients 
Months 
Since Birth 







-17 to -12 0.34 0.19 0.34 0.19 0.83 
-15 to -9 0.57 0.29 0.69 0.40 0.51 
-12 to -6 0.76 0.33 0.43 0.63 0.42 
-9 to -3 0.28 0.56 0.11 0.17 0.86 
-6 to 0 0.07* 0.43 0.18 0.06* 0.74 
-3 to +3 0.11 0.34 0.21 0.24 0.65 
0 to + 6 0.37 0.18 0.21 0.61 0.60 
+3 to +9 0.06* 0.13 0.07* 0.61 0.12 
+6 to +12 0.07* 0.13 0.04** 0.50 0.14 
+9 to + 15 0.07* 0.93 0.02** 0.63 0.25 
+12 to + 18 0.22 0.61 0.11 0.83 0.26 
+ 15 to + 21 0.81 0.45 0.28 0.94 0.15 
+18 to +24 0.53 0.75 0.16 0.44 0.38 
-17 to 0 0.18 0.31 0.27 0.11 0.55 
0 to 24 0.08* 0.39 0.04** 0.70 0.28 
 
 
Table 14: Unemployment Sums of Months Since Birth * Policy Coefficients 
Months 
Since Birth 







-17 to -12 0.00 0.17 -0.12 0.03 0.21 
-15 to -9 0.04 0.24 -0.11 0.05 0.33 
-12 to -6 0.03 0.32 -0.19 0.09 0.14 
-9 to -3 -0.06 0.31 -0.34 0.07 -0.20 
-6 to 0 -0.03 0.24 -0.25 0.10 -0.26 
-3 to +3 0.00 0.20 -0.19 0.09 -0.18 
0 to + 6 -0.03 0.27 -0.28 0.11 -0.07 
+3 to +9 -0.10 0.35 -0.44 0.14 -0.30 
+6 to +12 -0.16 0.31 -0.51 0.09 -0.50 
+9 to + 15 -0.22 0.12 -0.51 -0.03 -0.61 
+12 to + 18 -0.21 0.18 -0.51 -0.09 -0.72 
+ 15 to + 21 -0.18 0.17 -0.45 -0.14 -0.22 
+18 to +24 -0.10 0.18 -0.34 -0.05 0.45 
-17 to 0 0.00 0.64 -0.49 0.17 0.05 






Table 15:  Unemployment P-Values of Joint Tests for Significance of Sums 
Months 
Since Birth 







-17 to -12 0.98 0.27 0.51 0.87 0.53 
-15 to -9 0.81 0.19 0.63 0.79 0.44 
-12 to -6 0.83 0.09* 0.39 0.66 0.77 
-9 to -3 0.72 0.13 0.14 0.71 0.71 
-6 to 0 0.87 0.26 0.31 0.64 0.63 
-3 to +3 1.00 0.37 0.47 0.68 0.75 
0 to + 6 0.87 0.23 0.27 0.63 0.90 
+3 to +9 0.61 0.13 0.11 0.56 0.62 
+6 to +12 0.41 0.20 0.07* 0.72 0.44 
+9 to + 15 0.26 0.61 0.07* 0.89 0.35 
+12 to + 18 0.33 0.47 0.10 0.71 0.29 
+ 15 to + 21 0.43 0.56 0.17 0.58 0.77 
+18 to +24 0.68 0.55 0.34 0.86 0.62 
-17 to 0 1.00 0.16 0.35 0.72 0.96 
0 to 24 0.54 0.33 0.15 0.93 0.78 
 
VIII. Robustness Checks 
 
 To investigate sensitivity of estimates to weighting, I estimated each regression 
with and without weights, and plotted the results of both regressions in the figures below. 
Figure 4 depicts the point estimates of weighted and unweighted regressions using labor-
force participation as the dependent variable. Figure 5 depicts the results of weighted and 
unweighted regressions using employment as the dependent variable. Finally, Figure 6 
shows the results of weighted and unweighted regressions using unemployment as the 
dependent variable. The specific values obtained from each regression are reported in 
Table 25, Table 26, and Table 27, located in the Appendix. The results yield similar 

























IX. Occupational Group Results 
 
 Testing the hypothesis that paid family leave policies may have differential 
effects across occupations, I estimate Equation 1 for each occupational group, and report 
in this paper the results from three such occupational groups: management, office and 
administrative support, and education, training, and library occupations. Figures of point 
estimates from selected additional occupational groups are reported in the Appendix. 
 
 A. Management  
 
 Figure 7 depicts the point estimates for the effect of paid family leave policy on 
the labor-force participation, employment, and unemployment of women in management 
occupations. Table 16 describes the probability values for joint tests of significance 
across windows. Table 17 contains the sums of coefficients for each window, signifying 
the estimated effect of the policy on labor-market outcomes, given in person-months. 
Table 18 contains the probability values for the tests of significance of the coefficient 
sums. For example, in the window of 9 months post-birth to 15 months post-birth, paid 
family leave policy is estimated to increase the employment of mothers in management 
occupations by 2.86 person-months. The p-value for the joint test of significance of this 
effect is 0.07, while the p-value for the test for significance of the coefficient sums is 
0.09. 
The investigation of the effect of paid family leave on the labor-market outcomes 





The estimated effect on labor-force participation is positive for each window following 
twelve months before birth. The estimated effect on employment is positive in each 
window. The estimate effect of paid family leave policy on unemployment is negative in 
the vast majority of time periods. However, there is less significance in the results of the 
analysis on women in management roles than found in the analysis of the full sample. 
Considering the sample size of only 131 individuals in management occupations, this is 
to be expected. 
 






Table 16: Management P-Values of Joint Tests: Months Since Birth * Policy Coefficients 
Months Since Birth Labor-force 
Participation 
Working Looking 
-17 to -12 0.32 0.13 0.55 
-15 to -9 0.63 0.29 0.59 
-12 to -6 0.72 0.86 0.73 
-9 to -3 0.52 0.53 0.80 
-6 to 0 0.73 0.40 0.90 
-3 to +3 0.82 0.36 0.65 
0 to + 6 0.67 0.58 0.40 
+3 to +9 0.40 0.72 0.43 
+6 to +12 0.19 0.44 0.48 
+9 to + 15 0.09* 0.07* 0.69 
+12 to + 18 0.21 0.26 0.52 
+ 15 to + 21 0.33 0.42 0.71 
+18 to +24 0.35 0.43 0.81 
-17 to 0 0.55 0.25 0.87 
0 to +24 0.12 0.33 0.58 
 
Table 17: Management Sums of Months Since Birth * Policy Coefficients 
Months Since Birth Labor-force 
Participation 
Working Looking 
-17 to -12 -0.19 1.24 -0.61 
-15 to -9 -0.21 1.14 -0.37 
-12 to -6 0.20 1.05 0.03 
-9 to -3 0.63 1.29 -0.13 
-6 to 0 0.88 1.63 -0.07 
-3 to +3 1.07 2.35 -0.11 
0 to + 6 1.21 2.24 -0.04 
+3 to +9 1.36 2.21 0.05 
+6 to +12 1.21 2.14 -0.19 
+9 to + 15 1.58 2.86 -0.43 
+12 to + 18 1.69 2.98 -0.55 
+ 15 to + 21 1.33 2.77 -0.53 
+18 to +24 1.33 3.02 -0.83 
-17 to 0 0.90 3.74 -0.68 










Table 18: Management P-Values of Joint Tests for Significance of Sums 
Months Since Birth Labor-force 
Participation 
Working Looking 
-17 to -12 0.82 0.14 0.48 
-15 to -9 0.85 0.31 0.69 
-12 to -6 0.84 0.39 0.97 
-9 to -3 0.56 0.36 0.87 
-6 to 0 0.44 0.28 0.92 
-3 to +3 0.33 0.12 0.87 
0 to + 6 0.29 0.14 0.96 
+3 to +9 0.28 0.17 0.95 
+6 to +12 0.37 0.21 0.83 
+9 to + 15 0.24 0.09* 0.65 
+12 to + 18 0.24 0.08* 0.61 
+ 15 to + 21 0.36 0.11 0.62 
+18 to +24 0.35 0.10 0.40 
-17 to 0 0.71 0.21 0.73 
0 to +24 0.26 0.10 0.69 
 
 B. Office and Administrative Support 
 
 Plots of point estimates for the effect of paid family leave policy on labor-market 
outcomes of mothers in office and administrative support occupations are depicted in 
Figure 8.  Probability values yielded from joint tests of significance of coefficients in 
each window are reported in Table 19. Table 20 contains the sums of coefficients across 
each window, representing the effect of paid family leave policy on the labor-market 
outcome in person-months. Probability values yielded from tests for significance of the 
coefficient sums are reported in Table 21. The estimated effect of paid leave policy on the 
labor force participation of women in office and administrative support occupations 18 to 





significance for coefficients in this window is 0.02. The p-value of the test of significance 
for the sums of the coefficients in this window is 0.05.  
 Interestingly, the analysis of the effect of paid family leave on mothers in office 
and administrative support occupations yields positive estimated effects on all three 
labor-market outcomes across all time windows. This differs from the negative estimated 
effect of paid family leave policy found in the analysis of the full sample. However, 
neither joint tests for significance nor tests of coefficient sums yield significance at the 
10% level in any time period. Therefore, we are unable to conclude the positive estimated 
effect of paid family leave on unemployment for women in this occupation group is not 







Figure 8: Effect of Paid Family Leave Policy  for Office and Administrative Support Roles  
 
Table 19: Office P-Values of Joint Tests: Months Since Birth * Policy Coefficients 
Months Since Birth Labor-force 
Participation 
Working Looking 
-17 to -12 0.06* 0.09* 0.88 
-15 to -9 0.18 0.60 0.80 
-12 to -6 0.34 0.61 0.55 
-9 to -3 0.41 0.70 0.42 
-6 to 0 0.34 0.17 0.53 
-3 to +3 0.32 0.23 0.62 
0 to + 6 0.24 0.59 0.55 
+3 to +9 0.51 0.68 0.76 
+6 to +12 0.35 0.83 0.60 
+9 to + 15 0.19 0.82 0.68 
+12 to + 18 0.35 0.79 0.73 
+ 15 to + 21 0.04** 0.48 0.57 
+18 to +24 0.02** 0.32 0.25 
-17 to 0 0.11 0.09* 0.77 







Table 20: Office Sums of Months Since Birth * Policy Coefficients 
Months Since Birth Labor-force 
Participation 
Working Looking 
-17 to -12 0.36 0.23 0.15 
-15 to -9 1.03 0.92 0.10 
-12 to -6 1.52 1.36 0.01 
-9 to -3 1.82 1.76 0.11 
-6 to 0 1.85 1.83 0.36 
-3 to +3 1.52 1.89 0.44 
0 to + 6 1.50 2.06 0.49 
+3 to +9 1.57 1.81 0.61 
+6 to +12 1.49 1.67 0.49 
+9 to + 15 1.35 1.62 0.25 
+12 to + 18 1.57 1.84 0.15 
+ 15 to + 21 2.02 2.35 0.13 
+18 to +24 2.61 2.79 0.38 
-17 to 0 3.15 2.95 0.48 




Table 21: Office P-Values of Joint Tests for Significance of Sums 
Months Since Birth Labor-force 
Participation 
Working Looking 
-17 to -12 0.45 0.70 0.64 
-15 to -9 0.18 0.30 0.80 
-12 to -6 0.12 0.21 0.97 
-9 to -3 0.08* 0.12 0.76 
-6 to 0 0.07* 0.11 0.36 
-3 to +3 0.13 0.10 0.27 
0 to + 6 0.15 0.08* 0.22 
+3 to +9 0.14 0.14 0.18 
+6 to +12 0.18 0.19 0.31 
+9 to + 15 0.26 0.22 0.60 
+12 to + 18 0.22 0.18 0.75 
+ 15 to + 21 0.13 0.10 0.79 
+18 to +24 0.05* 0.05* 0.45 
-17 to 0 0.13 0.22 0.59 






 C. Education, Training, and Library 
 
 Figure 9 depicts point estimates of the effect in a given month of paid leave policy 
on labor-market outcomes of women in education, training and library occupations. Table 
22 contains probability values for joint tests of significance for coefficients in each 
window. Table 23 details the values for sums of coefficients in each window. Table 24 
contains probability values for the tests for significance of the sums of coefficients.  
 The results of the analysis conducted on women in education, training, and library 
roles counters the findings of the full sample. Across all time periods, the estimated effect 
of paid family leave on labor-force participation and employment is negative, while the 
estimated effect of paid family leave on unemployment is positive. Joint tests for 
significance of the effect on labor-force participation yield p-values of less than 0.10 in a 
number of time periods including the window of six to twelve months after birth. 
Similarly, joint tests for significance of the effect of paid leave on employment yield p-
values of less than 0.10 in the windows of 9 to 15 months after birth and 12 to 18 months 
after birth. Tests for the positive effect on employment do not yield significance at the 
10% level in any time period however (neither joint tests of coefficients nor tests of 
coefficient sums). These results suggest that although there exists a general trend of 
positive effect of paid family leave on labor-force participation and employment for most 





Figure 9: Effect of Paid Family Leave Policy for Education, Training, and Library Occupations 
 
Table 22: Education  P-Values of Joint Tests: Months Since Birth * Policy Coefficients 
Months Since Birth Labor-force 
Participation 
Working Looking 
-17 to -12 0.32 0.35 0.38 
-15 to -9 0.09* 0.31 0.59 
-12 to -6 0.06* 0.10 0.49 
-9 to -3 0.22 0.18 0.52 
-6 to 0 0.78 0.35 0.53 
-3 to +3 0.22 0.54 0.64 
0 to + 6 0.30 0.63 0.40 
+3 to +9 0.20 0.36 0.56 
+6 to +12 0.06* 0.14 0.38 
+9 to + 15 0.17 0.05* 0.24 
+12 to + 18 0.41 0.09* 0.23 
+ 15 to + 21 0.38 0.32 0.42 
+18 to +24 0.34 0.20 0.62 
-17 to 0 0.21 0.16 0.82 







Table 23: Education Sums of Months Since Birth * Policy Coefficients 
Months Since Birth Labor-force 
Participation 
Working Looking 
-17 to -12 -0.40 -0.52 0.43 
-15 to -9 -1.21 -0.89 0.51 
-12 to -6 -1.63 -1.42 0.48 
-9 to -3 -1.72 -1.34 0.48 
-6 to 0 -1.16 -1.41 0.57 
-3 to +3 -1.27 -1.44 0.67 
0 to + 6 -1.74 -1.69 0.64 
+3 to +9 -2.24 -1.47 0.49 
+6 to +12 -2.39 -2.21 0.70 
+9 to + 15 -2.19 -2.25 0.85 
+12 to + 18 -2.02 -2.05 0.83 
+ 15 to + 21 -1.75 -1.25 0.73 
+18 to +24 -1.43 -1.14 0.94 
-17 to 0 -2.81 -2.90 1.33 
0 to +24 -6.64 -5.92 2.70 
 
 
Table 24: Education P-Values of Joint Tests for Significance of Sums 
Months Since Birth Labor-force 
Participation 
Working Looking 
-17 to -12 0.48 0.50 0.21 
-15 to -9 0.15 0.41 0.25 
-12 to -6 0.07* 0.22 0.36 
-9 to -3 0.07* 0.25 0.42 
-6 to 0 0.25 0.26 0.37 
-3 to +3 0.26 0.28 0.30 
0 to + 6 0.17 0.23 0.32 
+3 to +9 0.10 0.34 0.44 
+6 to +12 0.09* 0.19 0.32 
+9 to + 15 0.11 0.18 0.24 
+12 to + 18 0.14 0.21 0.25 
+ 15 to + 21 0.21 0.45 0.30 
+18 to +24 0.27 0.48 0.20 
-17 to 0 0.18 0.28 0.32 








 This study reproduces and confirms the work of Tanya Byker (2016). Her 
findings on the positive effect of paid family leave on labor-force participation and 
employment as well as the negative effect on unemployment are reproduced and 
extended across a further range of time periods. The evidence presented in this paper 
supports her hypothesis that paid family leave indeed has the potential to increase the 
labor-force participation of women in the months surrounding childbirth, especially for 
women without college degrees. However, like Byker’s study, the methodology used here 
does not reveal the specific mechanism causing this increase in labor-force attachment. 
Testing robustness of estimates to weighting yields similar patterns of labor-market 
outcomes for both weighted and unweighted regressions. 
 Extension of Byker’s regressions to mothers of different occupational groups 
reveals differential effects of paid leave policy. While analysis women in management 
occupations as well as women in office and administrative support roles yields estimates 
mirroring those of the full sample, analysis of women in education, training, and library 
occupations reveals contrary effects of paid family leave policy. These results suggest 
that occupation is an important factor in determining the effect of paid family leave 
policy on labor-market outcomes. However, considering the small sample sizes available 
for each occupational group, I hesitate to draw strong conclusions from these results. 
Further study using a larger sample is advised to accurately estimate the effect of paid 





 A difficulty in interpreting the effect of paid family leave on labor-market 
outcomes is due to the nature of the specification. While a binary encoding is intuitive for 
labor-force participation, using a binary encoding of ‘working’ and ‘looking for work’ 
does not allow for a nuanced interpretation of effects. A change in the probability of 
working or looking for work reflects both changes in labor-force participation and 
changes in employment. Under the specification used for example, it is unclear whether 
the increase in probability of working for women without a college degree is due to 
women remaining employed when they would have otherwise dropped out of the labor-
force, or women remaining employed when they would have otherwise become 
unemployed. If I were to redo this study from the beginning, I would use a multinomial 
logistic regression model to identify the relative changes of probability of each labor-
market outcome compared to each other possible outcome. 
 As paid family leave policies proliferate across states, further studies may make 
use of larger sample sizes and longer time frames to more robustly estimate the effects 
studied in this paper. Furthermore, data containing ties of women to employers over time 
may allow tests of the hypothesis that paid family leave policy encourages greater 
attachment to employers in place of career interruptions surrounding childbirth. Longer-
term longitudinal data may also provide insight into the long-term effects of paid family 
leave on the career outcomes of mothers. However, given the data currently available, I 
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